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Turkey is a country that will bemost negatively affected byIran’s nuclear-weapons capabil-ity, if and when it is developed.
If Iran builds a nuclear stockpile, it will only
add a new dimension to its already militar-
ily superior position vis-à-vis the Gulf
states: the United Arab Emirates, Qatar
and Saudi Arabia, in particular.  Syria will
most likely remain Iran’s one and only ally
in the region, primarily due to geopolitical
considerations, at least for as long as the
Asad dynasty or a like-minded ruler
remains in power.
Relations between Iran and the former
Soviet republics in the Caucasus and
Central Asia have grown steadily in many
areas since they gained their indepen-
dence. No serious bone of contention
exists between them and Iran, with the
exception of the Azeri people’s aspirations
to “greater Azerbaijan” on both sides of the
Iranian-Azerbaijani border.1  However,
these calls are not powerful enough to
trigger a secessionist movement in the
region if Iran, with its Azeri clerical leader
Ali Khamenei, develops nuclear weapons.
Russia, the second-largest nuclear power
in the world, will not be challenged, even if
Iran builds a small stockpile of nuclear
weapons. Aside from the huge imbalances
between the two countries, no major hostili-
ties are on the horizon. There is also a
patron-client relationship between the two,
especially in the nuclear field, that is likely to
continue to strengthen Russia’s hand.
Iran’s would-be nuclear-weapons
capability is not going to pose a serious
challenge to Pakistan, India or China,
either.  All three are nuclear powers
already, and none of them have an
adversarial relationship with Iran that would
lead to a confrontation in the foreseeable
future. On the contrary, China and India’s
dependency on Iran’s oil and gas supplies is
likely to increase, affecting the pace of their
bilateral relations in favor of Iran.2
On the other hand, the hostile relation-
ship between Iran and the United States is
likely to persist in the coming years, as long
as Iran insists, inter alia, on continuing its
nuclear program.3  However, the presence
of a handful of nuclear weapons in Iran’s
military arsenal will not alter its inferior
position to the United States for a long time
to come.  Similarly, Israel’s nuclear capa-
bility will remain, by all measures, a
credible deterrent against nuclear blackmail
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by Iran. Moreover, in the Middle Eastern
context, the Israeli nuclear capability
cannot be considered separately from that
of the United States. As such, Iran would
not gain the upper hand in its relations with
Israel just because it had nuclear weapons.
By the same token, Iraq, where the United
States is building a new nation as its
protectorate, will most likely be given
strong, positive security guarantees with a
long-term commitment that will serve as a
credible deterrent against Iran’s would-be
nuclear-weapons capability.
Regarding Turkey, however, the
presence of nuclear weapons in the Iranian
military arsenal will upset the delicate
balance that has existed between the two
nations since the Treaty of Kasr-i Shirin in
1639, in favor of Iran.4  The topographic
and demographic characteristics of the
region and the presence of more or less
equal military capabilities on both sides of
the border have since forced the parties to
refrain from confronting each other.
Turkish authorities, both civilian and
military, would be expected to have raised
much more serious concerns about Iran’s
efforts to become a nuclear power, espe-
cially following the revelations in August
2002 by an Iranian opposition group of
Iran’s secret uranium-enrichment and
heavy-water production facilities, which
are clear indications of Iran’s long-term
ambitions.5  Nevertheless, Turkey has been
reluctant to assume a higher profile about
this matter; this would probably not have
been the case until only a few years ago.
TURKEY’S RELUCTANCE TO
CHALLENGE IRAN
Until the Islamic revolution in Iran in
1979, the Turks and the Iranians had
relatively quiet and harmonious relations
for more than three centuries without even
a serious border dispute. Yet the ambition
of the clerical leadership in Iran to export
its fundamentalist principles to secular and
democratic Turkey caused serious tension,
as the secular Republic of Turkey was
created in 1923 out of the ashes of the
Ottoman Empire, where Islamic sharia law
was applicable to the Muslim population.
The perpetuation of secular principles by
the predominantly Muslim Turkish popula-
tion has since been a highly sensitive issue
in domestic politics.
In the early 1990s, Turkey’s secular
elite blamed Iran for supporting religious
extremist groups in Turkey. They also held
Iran responsible for a series of assassina-
tions that claimed the lives of a number of
prominent secular intellectuals who had
pointed out the dangers of the Iranian
mullahs’ designs on Turkey.6  Moreover,
Turkish security officials have on a number
of occasions provided evidence of Iran’s
logistical support to PKK terrorists who
found refuge on the Iranian side of the
border. Added to these strains was the
competition between Turkey and Iran over
the “leadership” of the former Soviet
republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia,
which had cultural and religious common
denominators with both Turkey and Iran.7
As a result of the events leading up to
the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, however,
the relationship between Turkey and Iran
has entered a new phase. Similar concerns
about the probable consequences of
developments in Iraq may have motivated
the two countries to merge their political
stances with respect to regional political
issues. Since then, there has been an
unprecedented rapprochement between
Turkey and Iran resulting in an increase in
high-level official visits.
61
KIBAROGLU AND CAGLAR : IMPLICATIONS OF A NUCLEAR IRAN FOR TURKEY
Despite these positive signs, it is still
too early to say that relations between
Turkey and Iran will stay on the same
track for the long term. The nature as well
as the extent of Iran’s nuclear program is
highly likely to have a decisive impact on
the future of Turkish-Iranian relations.
However, there are too many unknown
factors that require further cooperation
between Iran and the international community
and its neighbors in order to provide more
transparency about its nuclear program.
IRAN’S CHANGING IMAGE IN
TURKEY
Less than a decade ago, had Iran
displayed similar ambitions to develop
elaborate nuclear capabilities, it would have
been confronted with much more negative
reactions from Turkey’s public and govern-
ment. A decade ago, the political climate in
Turkey was dramatically different, the
actors in the decision-making posts were
entirely different, and Turkey’s relations
with its neighbors were on a substantially
different track.
Back in the 1990s, Iran’s image in
Turkey was of a “dark” regime trying to
cause instability in Turkey and pave the
way to a similar (Islamic) revolutionary
movement. The tension has heightened
with the participation of the Iranian ambas-
sador to Ankara in a so-called “Jerusalem
night” organized by the Mayor of Sincan,
Bekir Yildiz, in a middle-sized suburb,
heavily populated with “religious” people.8
It was reported that the Iranian ambassa-
dor delivered fundamentalist messages to
the audience, harshly criticized Turkey’s
secularism, and cursed Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk, founder of the republic, for his
secular principles following the War of
Liberation (1919-22).
Shortly after this incident, on February
4, 1997, a convoy of main battle tanks and
armored vehicles rolled through the streets
of Sincan.9  The purpose was said to be to
display the determination of the secular
circles in the country, the armed forces at
the forefront, to defend the secular charac-
teristics of the government. This event was
also said to be responsible for sparking a
series of developments and popular demon-
strations that put an end to the two-party
Refah-Yol government in June of that year.10
The Refah-Yol government was
formed by the Welfare party (Refah
Partisi, RP), whose leader, Necmettin
Erbakan, was the prime minister, and by
the True Path party (Dogru Yol Partisi,
DYP) from the center-right, conservative
wing, whose leader, Tansu Ciller, was the
deputy prime minister. The Refah-Yol
government was the result of the demo-
cratic elections in spring 1996.  Half a
dozen parties entering the Grand National
Assembly had difficulty forming a coalition
without the RP deputies, seen at the time
as the representatives of the Islamist
factions in Turkey.
During his long career in politics,
Erbakan was well known for his Islamist
approach to politics. The Constitutional
Court in the 1970s and the military coup
leaders in the 1980s shut down his parties,
the National Order party (Milli Nizam
Partisi, MNP) and the National Salvation
party (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP). Yet, as
long as Erbakan was perceived as repre-
senting only a small percentage of the
Turkish population  that hoped to institute
sharia law, he did not pose an imminent
threat to the regime. However, his
unpredicted rise to the premiership and
hasty attempts to shift the direction of
Turkey’s mainstream foreign-policy
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orientation from the West to the Islamic
world were not acceptable to the “guard-
ians of the regime” (the army). His deci-
sion to pay his first official visit as the
prime minister of Turkey to the Islamic
Republic of Iran and his second visit to
Colonel Qaddafi’s Libya generated much
reaction in Turkey’s mainstream secular
circles. Such visits were out of the ordinary
in the history of the Turkish Republic. He
was, therefore, driven out of office after
only about a year, in a so-called post-
modern coup.11  The Constitutional Court
eventually shut down his Welfare party12
in January 1998 and its successor, the
Virtue party (Fazilet Partisi, FP), in June
200113  on the grounds that they “became
the logistical headquarters of the attempts
of the Islamist factions in Turkey to
overthrow the secular democratic regime
that was founded on Ataturk’s principles.”
IMPROVED IMAGE
The Sincan incident alone shows how
closely Iran’s activities in Turkey were
being monitored and how promptly state
structure confronted them. Nevertheless,
today there is a substantially different
attitude toward Iran, even though its
nuclear-weapons capability, if developed, is
likely to pose a much more serious threat
to the secular democratic regime in Turkey.
There must be an explanation for such a
change of attitude.  Revelations about
Iran’s large-scale clandestine nuclear
activities came at a time when dramatic
changes had taken place both in Turkey
and the world, changes that resulted in the
apparent reluctance of Turkey to challenge
Iran on the nuclear issue.
Until September 11, 2001, Turkey’s
relations with the United States were quite
good. There were only sporadic disagree-
ments, albeit serious ones, over the en-
forcement of the no-fly-zone policy toward
Iraq that had been in place since 1991.
According to many in Turkey, this policy
helped an autonomous Kurdish political
entity in northern Iraq to flourish.14  Rela-
tions with Israel, on the other hand, were
historically very good, reaching their zenith
with the signing of a comprehensive
military agreement in 1996 that encom-
passed the upgrading by Israel of Turkey’s
aging air power.15  The role of Israel in
Turkey’s unprecedented pressure on Syria
in autumn 1998 to cease its longstanding
support of the PKK terrorist organization
as well as to expel its leader, Abdullah
Ocalan, from Syria (later captured in
Kenya), cannot be underestimated.
Notwithstanding the generally good
relations between Turkey and the United
States and Israel, a series of developments
took place in the aftermath of the Septem-
ber 11 attacks that have dramatically
altered the vision of the world on both
sides. According to many political analysts
and statesmen alike, Turkish-American
relations suffered an unprecedented blow
with the failure of a resolution in the
Turkish Grand National Assembly on
March 1, 2003, that would have allowed
the deployment of tens of thousands of
U.S. troops in Turkish territory as part of
the war against Iraq.16
Another serious blow to bilateral
relations came on July 4, 2003, when U.S.
troops detained a dozen soldiers from the
Turkish Special Forces who had been
operating for more than a decade in the
northern districts of Iraq, monitoring and
collecting intelligence with the knowledge
of U.S. authorities. This shocking incident,
which appalled Turkish military authorities
as well as the entire nation, has since been
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the source of the skyrocketing anti-
American feelings in almost every segment
of Turkish society.
Moreover, the obvious support by the
United States of Kurdish groups in north-
ern Iraq, who are believed by many in
Turkey to be only a few steps away from
proclaiming independence, also damaged
bilateral relations.  Added to these is the
belief that the United States is preventing
Turkey from launching a military operation
against the Kandil Mountains on the
Iranian border in northern Iraq, which are
used by thousands of PKK terrorists as a
safe-haven from which to attack Turkish
security forces and villagers in Turkey.
Israel is believed in Turkey to be
closely linked with those U.S. policies
toward Iraq in general and the Kurdish
region in particular that ultimately hurt
Turkey’s vital interests in the region.17
Some analysts in Turkey go even further,
asserting that Israel actually dictates these
policies to the United States, thanks to its
influence on Capitol Hill.18
Apart from such mainly nationalist
(ulusalci) interpretations of U.S. and
Israeli policies toward the Middle East in
general and Iraq in particular, there is also
a separate Islamist interpretation of what is
happening in and around Turkey and why.19
The reactions of the Christian and Jewish
populations to the September 11 attacks
have resulted in anti-Islamic rhetoric from
many Western politicians and media.  In
most cases, Islam is directly or indirectly
associated with terrorism; or, at best,
religious extremism is an antagonist to
Western culture, the “other.”  Such an
approach has resulted in counterreactions
in the Islamic world that triggered brutal
demonstrations in Muslim countries against
Christianity and Judaism and their repre-
sentatives. The military offensives of U.S.
troops in Iraq that were covered exten-
sively in the Muslim media have also
deeply affected public opinion and fueled
anti-Americanism.
Hence, the coming of the Justice and
Development party (Adalet ve Kalkinma
Partisi, AKP) to power in Turkey with an
Islamist as well as a liberal-conservative
appeal in the November 2002 general
elections cannot be fully explained without
considering the background mentioned
above.20   The foreign-policy behavior of
the AKP toward the United States and
Israel has been generally in conformity
with Turkey’s traditional approach. Yet
many in Turkey saw the AKP as a continu-
ation of the Islamist parties — the MSP,
the RP and the FP, all of which were
banned from politics — and Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, the leader of the AKP and the
prime minister, as being no different than
Erbakan.  At first, the AKP government did
not choose to confront the United States
and Israel head-on regarding foreign-policy
matters.
However, deputies of the AKP and
Prime Minister Erdogan himself eventually
started to make bitter statements about
Israel and its policies toward the Palestin-
ians, in particular. Prime Minister Erdogan
has publicly criticized Israel, here and
there, for “committing state terror” follow-
ing the planned assassinations of the
spiritual leaders of Hamas and the demoli-
tion of Palestinians’ houses in Gaza by the
Israeli security forces. Moreover, despite
the fact that Hamas was officially recog-
nized as a terrorist organization by Turkish
authorities, the Hamas leader-in-exile,
Khaled Meshal, was given a warm recep-
tion in the AKP headquarters in Ankara in
February 2005.21
64
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XV, NO. 4, WINTER  2008
These and other developments have
apparently distanced Turkey from Israel.
Although statements were made to the
contrary after official visits — fewer in
number and at lower levels than those of
only a few years ago and with much less
warmth before the cameras — relations
are still far from the levels they could have
reached with the momentum that was built
less than a decade ago.22
The nationalists in Turkey applaud the
Iranian leadership and their “dignified”
policies for protecting Iran’s rights and
national interests against the world’s “only
superpower.”  They also suggest a similar
attitude to the Turkish politicians, whom
they harshly criticized for their inability to
take measures, under pressure from the
U.S. administration, against Kurdish
leaders or the PKK terrorists in northern
Iraq. The Islamists, on the other hand,
support Iran’s quest for nuclear power,
which, in their view, terrifies Israel and will
bring the Jewish state to respect their
Muslim brothers in Palestine and else-
where in the world.
Against this background, it is not
difficult to understand public sentiment in
Turkey toward the United States and
Israel. Negative feelings toward these
countries, which were Turkey’s closest
allies in the recent past, have not only
resulted in the gradual worsening of
bilateral relations at the governmental level,
but also have caused the Turks to lend
huge support to other countries, such as
Iran, that defy U.S. and Israeli policies.
IRAN’S NUCLEAR AMBITIONS
There is little wonder that public
sentiment toward other nations affects the
foreign policies of governments every-
where in the world.  AKP governments,
since 2002, have proved not to be excep-
tions to this rule; they are reluctant to
challenge Iran on the nuclear issue due to
the support among the Turkish public for
Iran’s nuclear program. However, govern-
ments have a primary duty to pursue the
vital interests of their nations. This re-
quires, among other things, avoiding
emotional approaches to the formulation of
foreign and security policies.  Therefore,
Turkey, even under the current AKP
government, may be forced to change its
reluctant attitude, if and when Iran ad-
vances its nuclear capabilities and gets
closer to the threshold of nuclear-weapons
manufacturing.  Moreover, Turkey has
been elected to the UN Security Council as
a non-permanent member and also to the
Board of Governors of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the
next couple of years.  It is highly likely that
Iran and its nuclear program will figure
heavily on the agendas of both organiza-
tions.  Turkey will have to vote one way or
another on these matters and may make
significant constructive contributions in the
eventual peaceful resolution of the dispute
between Iran and the West.
TURKEY’S POSITION ON IRAN’S
NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Turkey officially recognizes the right of
Iran, a member of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
to develop nuclear technology, provided
that it remains on a peaceful track and
allows for the application of full-scope
safeguard inspections by the IAEA in a
way that would lend the utmost confidence
to the international community about its
intentions.  Prime Minister Erdogan has
made statements to this effect on a number
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of occasions. In an interview with the
Kuwaiti newspaper El Anba in March
2007, he reiterated the diplomatic position
of his government: “States have the right to
possess nuclear energy to utilize for
peaceful purposes.” He also emphasized
that Turkey has good neighborly relations
with Iran and that the two countries have
developed mechanisms for the purpose of
cooperation on security issues.23
More recently, at the Munich Security
Conference in February 2008, Prime
Minister Erdogan responded to a
journalist’s question as to “why Turkey did
not seem to be worried” about Iran’s
nuclear program: “Our Iranian colleagues
tell us that they want nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes to satisfy their energy
needs, not for weapons.” Erdogan reiter-
ated that the work in the nuclear field
would soon start in Turkey: “I’m afraid
some people may accuse us of having
ambitions for producing weapons of mass
destruction, too.”24
In addition to the pressure emanating
from the warm attitude of the Turkish
people toward Iran on the nuclear issue,
especially among the constituents of the
AKP government — partly because
Turkey will soon launch yet another bid to
establish its first nuclear reactor, and partly
due to the fact that no clear violations of
Iran’s NPT obligations have been reported
— Turkey’s official position regarding
Iran’s nuclear program has been low-
profile, at least for the time being.
However, consensus among the
Turkish political and security elite is that,
contrary to its official stance, Turkey
cannot stay aloof from Iran’s nuclearization
for long, even under the AKP govern-
ment.25  If and when unequivocal signs of
Iran’s efforts to advance its existing
nuclear capability toward weaponization
are received by Turkish authorities through
various sources, it is highly likely that the
issue will figure more frequently on the
National Security Council’s agenda.26
There have already been statements from
leading figures in Turkey expressing
concern about Iran’s nuclear program and
its intentions.
In an address to the Turkish War
Colleges in Istanbul in April 2005, then
Chief of the Turkish General Staff Gen.
Hilmi Ozkok stated, “Doubts about Iranian
efforts to influence the regimes of the
surrounding states have disturbed Turkey
and have been responsible for the low level
of relations between Turkey and Iran.”
After asserting that Turkey, like other
states, had observed Iran’s nuclear efforts
with concern, Gen. Ozkok said, “Creation
of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the
Middle East is Turkey’s policy.”27
Similarly, then Minister of Foreign
Affairs Abdullah Gul (currently the presi-
dent of the Turkish Republic), in response
to a motion in the Turkish Grand National
Assembly in June 2006, stated, “The IAEA
Director General’s reports have revealed
the fact that Iran concealed its nuclear
program for years, which creates suspi-
cions about Iran’s intentions.” After
mentioning that Ankara was carefully
observing developments in the Iranian
nuclear program, which had gradually
attained a more serious dimension, Gul
said, “The emergence of the possibility of
Iran’s possessing a nuclear weapon
disturbs Turkey, as all the members of
international society.”28
On the same subject, speaking at the
World Economic Forum in May 2006,
Prime Minister Erdogan emphasized the
facilitating role of political dialogue and
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political approaches to the settlement of the
Iranian issue. Turkey, he said, “ought to
take certain steps as a neighbor of Iran, but
it is impossible for Turkey to approach the
nuclear energy issue when it is perceived
as weapons of mass destruction.”29
INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITIES
Notwithstanding the current apparent
reluctance of Turkey to challenge Iran,
which is due partly to the lack of a coher-
ent approach toward Iran in the interna-
tional arena, the above statements suggest
that Turkey is indeed carefully monitoring
the situation from a wider perspective.  At
the same time, Ankara is determining
alternative policies to minimize the possible
negative effects to its national interests and
security of the eventual weaponization of
Iran’s nuclear program. Nevertheless,
Turkey does not have a wide array of
choices due to a number of limitations
arising from its institutional liabilities.
Membership in Non-Proliferation
Regimes
In a broader context, the fundamental
thrust of Turkish foreign and security policy
has been for Turkey to become a state
party to international arms control and
disarmament agreements, wherever
appropriate, so as to contribute to their
effective implementation. Accordingly,
Turkey became a state party to the NPT
by signing the treaty on  January 28, 1969,
and subsequently ratifying it on April 17,
1980.30  It also became a state party to the
Biological Weapons Convention of 1972
(ratifying it in November 1974) and signing
the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993
(ratifying it in April 1997). Moreover,
Turkey took steps in the late 1990s to
become a member of the Nuclear Suppli-
ers Group (NSG) and was successful in
June 2000.31  Turkey has sped up the
process of adjusting its national export-
control regime (laws and regulations) to
that of the NSG countries. Turkey has
undertaken the same stance toward the
Zangger Committee and became a mem-
ber, almost as an automatic outcome of its
formal accession to the NSG.32
In April 1997, Turkey also became a
member of the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR), which aims to demon-
strate to the actual and potential
proliferants that there is a solid bloc of like-
minded nations that are unified in the
determination to fight against prolifera-
tion.33  Because of the two small nuclear
research reactors operating in the country,
Turkey signed the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 and ratified it
in 2000 as one of 44 states whose ratifica-
tion was necessary for the treaty to
become effective.34  As a member of the
Conference on Disarmament (CD), Turkey
is “pleasured” to have joined the over-
whelming majority of nations in the effort
to conclude the CTBT. The complete ban
on nuclear testing, the core function of the
treaty, is thought by Turkish officials to be
an effective measure to control nuclear-
weapons technology and an important step
toward the eventual elimination of nuclear
weapons.
As a country that never sought to
acquire weapons of mass destruction,
Turkey also contributed to international
efforts to strengthen the NPT regime and
participated actively in the process of
enhancing the IAEA’s verification system
with a view to making safeguard inspec-
tions more intrusive. As for the Additional
Protocol that was released by the IAEA as
a result of “Programme 93+2,” Turkey
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became a state party to it by signing and
ratifying the document in July 2000.35
Against this background, one might
argue that Turkey’s record in the nuclear
field has been one of success in its non-
proliferation standing, but an undisputed
failure in exploiting the peaceful applica-
tions of nuclear technology.36
NATO Membership
The second reason for limited options
vis-à-vis the rise of a nuclear-weapons-
capable Iran is Turkey’s membership in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). As a member of NATO since
1952, Turkey is theoretically given “positive
security guarantees” by the other members
of the alliance, according to Article 5 of the
1949 Washington treaty, meaning that
Turkish territory would be covered by a
“nuclear umbrella” against attacks from
other countries, including Iran. Turkey has
accepted deployment of U.S.-origin
nuclear weapons on its soil in accordance
with the nuclear strategies of the alliance
since the decision taken at the 1959 NATO
summit in Rome.37  The presence of U.S.
nuclear weapons in Turkey may be consid-
ered by outside observers and by experts
inside Turkey to be an insurance policy that
would be sufficient to deter possible
intentions of Iran in the future.38
EU Candidacy
A third reason that limits the options
available to Turkish decisionmakers in case
Iran has weaponized its nuclear infrastruc-
ture is Turkey’s candidate status before the
European Union (EU). As such, if devel-
oped, Turkey’s nuclear program would be
under the scrutiny of the relevant institu-
tions of the EU throughout the accession
negotiations. If and when the accession
process is successfully completed, Turkey
will have to become a state party to the
EURATOM Treaty as a condition of full
membership. This would permit only
peaceful applications of nuclear technology.
DEFICIENCIES OF INSTITUTIONS
LIMITING TURKEY’S OPTIONS
All three reasons mentioned above
suggest that Turkey will not follow the path
of Iran by developing a dubious nuclear
infrastructure that may have weapons
implications in the future. However, will the
current standing of Turkey remain the
same for a long time to come? It is difficult
to give an affirmative answer to this
question with great confidence, due to
changing circumstances both inside and
outside of Turkey. Relations with the
above-mentioned institutions, which are
presented as insurance policies against
Turkey’s potential inclination toward “going
nuclear,” may not remain on the same
track in the long term.
Weakening of the NPT Regime
Regarding the danger of the spread of
WMD in the world, Turkey’s fundamental
policy has long been to support interna-
tional initiatives that aim at strengthening
the chemical, biological and nuclear non-
proliferation regimes, with special emphasis
on their inspection and verification mecha-
nisms. However, a series of developments
over the last decade has cast doubts on the
future prospects of the NPT regime: North
Korea’s nuclear detonation; revelations about
Iran’s secret facilities suitable for fissile-
material production; the U.S.-India nuclear
deal; failure to get the ratification of the
IAEA Additional Protocol from all concerned
states, including Iran; failure to urge the
enforcement of the Comprehensive Test-Ban
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Treaty (CTBT); and failure to start negotia-
tions for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty
(FMCT). This list could be expanded.
Added to these has been the unequal
and unacceptable treatment of Turkey by
the major Western suppliers of nuclear
technology, such as the United States,
Germany and Canada, resulting in the
failure to install nuclear power plants in the
country.39  This situation caused a loss of
confidence among the Turks in the value of
the “bargain” inherent in the NPT: in return
for denouncing nuclear weapons, member
states would benefit from nuclear technol-
ogy transfer from other countries and/or
develop as much as they needed indig-
enously under international safeguards.
Turkey has acted as a responsible
member of the nuclear-non-proliferation
community and will remain so for the
foreseeable future. Therefore, it is not easy
to argue with great confidence that the
next generations of Turkish decisionmakers
will display similar unequivocal loyalty to
the nuclear non-proliferation regime, if
Iran, under the NPT provisions, cannot be
prevented from manufacturing nuclear
weapons or from developing breakout
capabilities that may enable it to assemble
weapons in a short period of time.40
Disputed NATO Security Guarantees
Membership in NATO has meant more
than security guarantees for most Turks.
NATO has been perceived as part of
Turkey’s “Western” identity. Throughout
the Cold War years, Turkey entertained an
undisputed status as a staunch ally of the
West. However, the collapse of the War-
saw Pact and the disintegration of the
Soviet Union brought down its reputation
as an indispensible ally and a bulwark
against the Communist threat. Soon after,
the alliance failed the first immediate test
of solidarity with Turkey, when Turkish
President Turgut Ozal called upon NATO
in 1991 to deploy the Rapid Reaction Force
in Turkey against the threat posed by
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq following its
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The
Western European members of NATO, in
particular, have dragged their feet in living
up to their Article 5 commitments, arguing
that the Middle East was “out of the area”
of NATO’s operation zone.41
A similar situation arose in 2003, when
Turkey formally asked the North Atlantic
Council to activate Article 4 of the Wash-
ington treaty with a view to starting
deliberations on the possible measures that
each member nation would have to take in
the run-up to the second Gulf War, in order
to protect Turkey against Iraq’s missiles
and WMD. NATO members once again
failed to honor their treaty obligations
toward Turkey. Added to these, the pro-
cess of the transformation of the alliance
from a collective-defense organization with
a “hard power” stance to a collective-
security organization with a perceived “soft
power” attitude, has further diluted the
image of NATO in the eyes of most Turks.
No less important is the effect of anti-
American sentiments among the Turkish
public in undermining the significance of
NATO, which is starting to be seen as
serving primarily the interests of the United
States and helping it to establish its world
hegemony.42  A number of remarks have
already been made publicly by high-ranking
military officers, civilian bureaucrats and
politicians suggesting that Turkey withdraw
from NATO and intensify relations with
other regional organizations instead.43
Although immature at this stage, the anti-
NATO attitude may grow to a significant
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level, as long as the alliance remains
indifferent to Turkey’s fight against the
PKK, some of whose members have long
found refuge in the territories of the allied
countries. Top military commanders,
diplomats and politicians in Turkey have,
time and again, emphasized the need for
the alliance to display its solidarity with
Turkey in its fight against terrorism. The
lack of such solidarity only exacerbates the
frustration of the Turkish public.44
EU Reluctance
Turkey has been striving to be a part of
the European integration process for nearly
half a century. Turkey and the European
Economic Community (EEC) signed the
Ankara Treaty in 1963, giving Turkey, in
theory, a full-membership perspective.
However, only after a long period of ups
and downs did Turkey manage to get a
date in 2004 to start formal accession
negotiations with the EU — and with
conditions attached.
Despite the fact that the start of
accession talks has brought Turkey institu-
tionally closer to the EU, the optimistic
mood among the Turks and the Europeans
soon took a negative turn. Suspicions of
Turkey’s suitability for membership have
grown ever since.45  European public
opinion is wary of the presence of a
Muslim community in the EU. If the
question of Turkey’s eventual accession
were put to public referenda, overwhelm-
ing majorities in countries like Austria and
France would likely cast negative votes.46
Recently, objections to Turkey’s
membership on the basis of identity-related
considerations have increased, while
arguments in favor of Turkish accession on
the basis of cost-benefit calculations have
lost ground. With the rise of Islamophobic
sentiments across the European continent
in the aftermath of the September 11
attacks, coupled with growing security
concerns over the existence of approxi-
mately 20 million Muslims, the EU has
increasingly become reluctant to develop a
strong geopolitical commitment to Turkey’s
eventual accession.47
Worst of all, accession negotiations
were suspended on eight of some 35
chapters, each of which must be success-
fully completed for full membership, only a
year after the start of the process, because
of Turkey’s resistance to European re-
quests to open its sea and air ports to
Greek Cypriot naval vessels and airplanes.
Against this background, it would not be
unfounded to argue that prospects for
Turkey’s accession talks to be completed
at an early date are not promising. They
are likely to take a long time, due to a
number of structural problems in the
relations between Turkey and the EU.48
IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Opinions in Turkey toward nuclear
weapons in general and Iran’s nuclear
program in particular exhibit stark differ-
ences, depending on one’s perspective.
While, on the one hand, a significant
degree of public support exists for Iran’s
nuclear endeavors, on the other hand,
serious concerns about the possible nega-
tive implications of Iran’s growing nuclear
capabilities are also expressed by the
security elite. The common denominator
between the two sides seems to support
the idea of Turkey’s nuclearization.
Public Perceptions
There has not been a serious discus-
sion, let alone a public debate, in Turkey
about nuclear weapons for decades, even
70
MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XV, NO. 4, WINTER  2008
though U.S. nuclear weapons have been
deployed in Turkey since 1960. One of the
main reasons for this has been the ultimate
authority of the military in matters relating
to national security. Hence, partly because
of the silence of the political and security
elites and partly because of the lack of
public interest in nuclear weapons, govern-
ments in Turkey have not experienced any
difficulty in adopting policies regarding
nuclear-weapons deployment on Turkish
territory. In comparison to some other
NATO countries such as Norway, which
preferred to remain nuclear-weapons free,
or Germany, where serious debates took
place over the deployment of U.S. nuclear
weapons on German soil, it would be fair to
say that there was no discussion in Turkey.49
The disclosure of Iraq’s clandestine
WMD programs in 1991 was not enough to
prompt a substantial public debate, either.
This ought not to be the case for a country
like Turkey, which sits in the immediate
proximity of the Middle East, the most
volatile region in the world, acknowledged
as fertile soil for state WMD aspirations.
However, today there is every reason for
Turks to wonder and to discuss publicly
whether their neighbors are attempting to
develop WMD, their means of delivery
having been acquired already, and what
should be done to counter the threat.
Revelations about Iran’s clandestine
enrichment program in August 2002 have
finally brought the debate into the open, not
only with its military-strategic implications,
but also with its political implications for
Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies.
Iran’s nuclear ambitions are mostly
welcome among the Turks for a number of
reasons.50  First, Iran’s defiance of U.S.
pressure to halt its enrichment program is
considered to be a dignified stance by a
small country against a global hegemonic
power. Second, Islam is a common de-
nominator between the Turks and the
Iranians, and the emergence of another
Muslim nation — after Pakistan — with
atomic power to deter the Christian and
Jewish bombs is considered a necessary
equalizer. Third, and in relation to the
second, anti-American and anti-Israeli
sentiments built up since the U.S. invasion
of Iraq, are so intense that anything seen
as hurting American or Israeli interests is
usually welcome.
There are hundreds of Internet sites,
blogs and chat rooms in which Turks
exchange their views on whether Iran’s
nuclear ambitions constitute a threat to
Turkey and whether Turkey should possess
nuclear weapons. The majority of Turks do
not believe that Iran, as a friendly Muslim
nation, would want to threaten Turkey with
its nuclear weapons, today or in the future,
especially when Israel is considered Iran’s
prime target. The prevailing view among
Turks supports the possession of nuclear
weapons, for reasons similar to those
expressed in the past by other countries.51
Views Among the Security Elite
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned
sentiments in support of Iran’s nuclear
ambitions, which are quite pervasive in
Turkish public opinion, intellectuals, journal-
ists, community leaders, and retired civil
and military bureaucrats have also as-
sessed the negative implications of Iran’s
nuclear ambitions for Turkey’s national
interests. Gunduz Aktan, a retired ambas-
sador and member of parliament from the
Nationalist Movement party (Milliyetci
Hareket Partisi, MHP), argued in March
2005: “Iran’s being on the path to produc-
ing nuclear weapons is a secret everybody
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knows.”52  After enumerating several
cases wherein Iran deliberately acted to
the detriment of Turkey, Aktan contended,
“Attaining nuclear weapons will elevate
Iran to the status of a regional power,
which it does not deserve, considering its
political regime and economic-development
level.”53  Turkey, to Aktan, does not want
“a conflict in the region after its Iraq
experience, but it does not want Iran
becoming a nuclear power either.”54
Prof. Umit Ozdag from Gazi Univer-
sity in Ankara, founder of the Eurasian
Center for Strategic Studies (ASAM),
stated in March 2005, “Iranian attainment
of nuclear weapons would cause Iran to
gain gravity in regional developments, in
the Middle East, Central Asia and the
Caucasus at the expense of Turkey. For
example, a nuclear Iran will have more
influence over Azerbaijan.”55  To Ozdag,
“Turkey will not accept living side by side
with an Iran possessing nuclear weapons
for a long period of time, and it will pro-
duce nuclear weapons to achieve balance,
since it will be difficult to live with an Iran
whose self-confidence has excessively
mounted. Also, the ensuing shift in the power
of conservatives in Iran will have adverse
implications for Turkish-Iranian relations.”56
In the wake of the Iranian elections in
June 2005, Cuneyt Ulsever, liberal colum-
nist in the daily Hurriyet, pointed to
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s declarations
during the election process about his desire
to develop nuclear power in Iran. Accord-
ing to Ulsever,
Turkey in its region and even in its
borders is facing a neighbor whose
worldview is in complete contradiction
with its worldview, which claims
preponderance in the region, which
has an ingrained and strong state
tradition, which is adept in issues of
intelligence, counter-espionage and
disinformation, which aims at possess-
ing nuclear power, and which now
explicitly states its intention to
advance in this direction.57  …Turkey
cannot consider the remarks of a
regime that pursues imperial policies in
its region and gives priority to
ideological acrimony, that renounces
the production of nuclear weapons as
a guarantee since the existence of
nuclear power is the threat itself and
there is no guarantee that a country
openly cooperating with terrorists will
not deliver nuclear power to its
accomplices when it is in trouble. May
God be with Turkey in the
Ahmadinejad era.58
Dogan Heper, a columnist in the daily
Milliyet argued in January 2006, “Follow-
ing the end of the Cold War, the world has
entered a process of turmoil or a process
of restructuring. Even though, today, it is
not possible to give a lucid answer to the
question of how long this process will
continue and what the shapes of the states
will be, in order not to regret at the end of
this process Turkey should take preventive
measures, that is, it should be strong.” For
Heper, the first condition of being strong is
“not to compromise the unity and the
integrity of Turkey and to attach impor-
tance to nuclear research and develop-
ment.” Heper states three main reasons to
bolster the argument that it is essential for
Turkey to develop nuclear weapons. First,
possessing nuclear weapons is a means to
protect the unity and integrity of Turkey
and its standing in the region. Second, in
addition to buoying its standing in the
region, an army possessing such a capabil-
ity would render Turkey an arbiter, a
determining power in its region. Third, a
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success in the nuclear arena would boost
the morale of the Turkish people. This, in
turn, would unite 70 million people and
consolidate their pride in being Turkish
citizens. For Heper, Turkey’s elevation to
the status of a nuclear power seems to be
a somewhat inevitable outcome, because,
he contends, “new conditions in the world
are compelling Turkey to develop nuclear
weapons.”59
Assoc. Prof. Celalettin Yavuz, Navy
Captain (ret.), argued in February 2006,
“Nuclear energy technology is an impetus for
space research and for possessing nuclear-
weapons technology in order to contribute to
Turkey’s deterrence capability.”60
A former independent member of
parliament from Istanbul, Emin Sirin, stated
in May 2006 in a press conference under
the roof of the Turkish Grand National
Assembly, “There is no humor in this issue,
and if Iran will not relinquish its ballistic
missiles and nuclear weapons program, so
as to preserve the regional balance, Turkey
must necessarily obtain nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles and sustain the
balance.”61  It is interesting to note the
arguments of some top-ranking military
officers, such as former Commanders of
the Turkish Air Force, Gen. Halis Burhan
(ret.) and Gen. Ergin Celasin (ret.): “If Iran
develops nuclear weapons, Turkey should
do the same so as to be able to preserve
the balance of power between the two
countries and also in the region.”
Similarly, former Minister of State
Vehbi Dincerler, from the right-of-center
and conservative Motherland party
(Anavatan Partisi, ANAP), takes the issue
to yet another level: “Turkey should not
only develop nuclear weapons, but the
quantity as well as the quality of Turkey’s
nuclear weapons arsenal should be on a
par with those of the other nations in the
region,” pointing at the Israeli nuclear
capability.62  In the same vein, Col. Taner
Altinok, Ph.D., director of the Institute for
Defense Studies of the Turkish Military
Academy in Ankara, argues, “Turkey
should definitely follow the path that Iran
walked over the years, both for energy
generation purposes so as to meet Turkey’s
growing demand for energy and also for
attaining a nuclear-weapons capability to
better protect Turkey’s national interests.
Regional balances and conjectural develop-
ments compel Turkey to do so.”63
OTHER FACTORS
It is possible to infer from the above
statements that, with or without the incite-
ment of Iran’s nuclear program, Turkey
may be on the way to seeking a nuclear-
weapons capability. However, as worri-
some as it might be in theory, there is
actually no need to press the panic button,
provided that some steps are taken by the
friends and allies of Turkey. Besides, it
would not be advisable for Turkey to “go
nuclear” under any circumstances.
Even though there is much talk in
Turkey about why the state should develop
nuclear weapons among those who ap-
proach the issue from the perspective of
national pride and prestige as well as
security, most decision makers are quite
aware that the possible consequences of
going nuclear would mean violation of
Turkey’s international obligations. Outside
powers point to the difficulties Turkey may
have to endure, but it also is state practice
in institutions such as the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the military. These
entities have always formulated and
conducted Turkey’s foreign and security
policies in line with Ataturk’s dictum,
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“peace at home, peace in the world.”
Against this backdrop, one should not
expect Turkey to embark upon a rushed
nuclear weapons program, even if Iran
crosses the critical threshold. Should this
happen, however, what will keep Turkey
from developing nuclear weapons will not
simply be responsible state practice. The
extent to which Turkey’s allies are willing
and able to allay its fears emanating from
the worsening regional security situation
will also have a decisive effect on policy
makers. Improving relations with the
United States and the EU, as well as
strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation
regime, will make the greatest impact in
this regard.
TURKISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS
After the failure of the Turkish Parlia-
ment on March 1, 2003, to pass a resolu-
tion allowing the stationing of at least
60,000 American troops in Turkish territory,
which was said to constitute the crux of
the U.S. strategy in its war on Iraq, Turkey
lost its significance in the eyes of the Bush
administration. Despite sporadic and short-
lived improvements in relations between
the two countries, especially at times of
high-level visits, the U.S. policy toward
Iraq apparently assigns much greater
weight to the demands of the Kurds in
northern Iraq than those of its long-time
NATO ally. This suggests that the general
nature of bilateral relations may not be any
better and may even be worse. An indica-
tion of this has been the unanticipated and
much resented attitude of the U.S. leader-
ship during Turkey’s recent ground opera-
tion against the PKK strongholds in
northern Iraq. Even though the White
House and the Pentagon were provided
detailed information in advance about the
scope, purpose and scale of the operation,
the undiplomatic statements made by
Defense Secretary Gates and President
Bush (“Turks should get out”) have once
again underlined the fact that the United
States considers the Kurds in northern Iraq
its primary strategic ally.64  If the newly
elected President Barack Obama and his
chief executives can look at world politics
from a wider perspective and see how
much Turkey fits into its strategic calcula-
tions, a level of strategic partnership may
be mutually rewarding. Otherwise,
decisionmakers of the next generation will
be more likely to assign strategic value to
the possession of nuclear weapons as
powerful deterrents against threats to
national security.65
RELATIONS WITH THE EU
The quantity and quality of reforms in
Turkey have been unprecedented since the
intensification of relations with the EU
following the 1999 Helsinki summit deci-
sions that formally declared Turkey a
“candidate state” for eventual full member-
ship. The impetus of candidacy has been
enormous, especially in overcoming the
deeply entrenched resistance in both the
public domain and the civil and military
bureaucracy to the reform packages that
have been put in effect one after another.
The legal, political, economic, social, cultural
and institutional outlook of Turkey has been
transformed dramatically. Nongovernmental
organizations, interest groups and civilian
activists flourished and soon gained substan-
tial ground in the formulation of policies by
concentrating their efforts in important issue
areas with a view to putting Turkey on the
right track and keeping it there.
Nevertheless, as noted earlier, the
mood in Europe has become more negative
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with respect to the prospects for Turkey’s
eventual full membership. Suspension of
the accession negotiations has exacerbated
Turkish public resistance to the EU re-
quests to take further steps toward democ-
ratization and economic growth. The net
effect has been the weakening of the
impact of civil-society organizations on the
policies of the government, which had once
relied heavily on their support to come to
power and stay there through the 2002 and
2007 parliamentary elections.
The awareness of societies around the
world of the perils of nuclear proliferation
is increasing with the growth of mass
media, where the consequences of WMD
development are discussed publicly. This
positive trend in some parts of the world
notwithstanding, the feeble opposition to
the nuclearization of Turkey cannot be
compared to the degree of overwhelming
support in the Turkish public domain given
to nuclear projects and the value assigned
to the acquiring of nuclear power. Hence,
unless the batteries of the engine driving
relations between Turkey and the EU
(accession negotiations) can be recharged,
there may be little hope that Turkey will
abjure nuclear weapons for long.
STRENGTHENING THE
NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES
North Korea acquired scientific and
technological capabilities and then decided
to walk away from the NPT in the run-up
to its first nuclear detonation in October
2006. Iran, being a party to the NPT, has
managed for many years to conceal its
efforts to establish significant capabilities to
enrich uranium and produce heavy water,
both of which are important landmarks on
the route to nuclear weapons development.
Iraq and Libya had displayed similar efforts
while staying in the NPT. These are
unequivocal signs of the weaknesses
inherent in the nuclear nonproliferation
regime. A major achievement has been the
conclusion of the Additional Protocol. It
has surely strengthened the IAEA’s
safeguards regime, though it has yet to
enter into force, especially in the states of
concern, including Iran. However, even the
experts argue that this is not enough.66
WHY TURKEY SHOULD NOT GO
NUCLEAR
If improved relations can be achieved
between Turkey and the United States as
well as the EU, and the nuclear nonprolif-
eration regime can be further strengthened,
Turkey’s acquisition of nuclear technology
will not necessarily become a cause for
serious concern. Turkey will be under the
scrutiny of the international community
through the effective implementation of
IAEA safeguards as a state party to the
NPT. This must be kept in mind, particu-
larly by those in Turkey who might still
aspire to nuclear-power status.
Another factor to remember is that
virtually no state has developed nuclear
weapons without substantial support and
effective cover from a superpower or
technologically advanced country. It is not
just speculation that the United Kingdom
and France received various degrees of
scientific or technological support from the
United States at various stages of their
nuclear-weapons programs. Israel received
support from France and Norway in
overcoming scientific and technological
barriers in the construction of the Dimona
reactor, which is central to its “opaque”
nuclear capacity.67  Similarly, South Africa
benefited from its nuclear ties with foreign
countries, particularly Israel, in building its
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nuclear weapons.68  On the other hand,
Pakistan gained technology from many
sources. This extensive assistance is
reported to have included, among other
things, uranium-enrichment technology
from Europe and blueprints for a small
nuclear weapon from China, along with
missile technology.69  The Indian nuclear-
weapons program might not have been
possible without the technology and
material provided by Canada and the
United States.70  China received partial
support from the Soviet Union when their
relationship was permissive, and China in
turn provided support to the Pakistani and
North Korean nuclear programs. In the
case of Iran, the role of China and Russia
cannot be overlooked.
Hence, one particular condition for
Turkey to go nuclear would be to secure
the endorsement of such a power. This,
however, is not imminent. Short of such
support, the only possible way of meeting
the scientific and technological require-
ments would be through an illegal network
similar to that of Abdel Qader Khan, the
“father of the Pakistani bomb,” now under
house arrest in Pakistan. The magnitude
and scope of illegal acquisition would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, in a
country like Turkey, where there are still
small but effective groups of concerned
people who would do their best to reveal
such critical information to the world.
Should such a development take place,
Turkey would be treated as a “rogue
state,”something unthinkable and unaccept-
able given Turkey’s record of nonprolifera-
tion efforts.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, even
if one considers for a moment that Turkey
has decided to go nuclear and managed to
get the support of a nuclear power, or that
it has established a clandestine nuclear-
weapons procurement network and gotten
away with it without being noticed, what
will be the role of nuclear weapons in
Turkey’s security and foreign policies? Will
nuclear weapons enhance Turkey’s
security? Or, will they simply harm
Turkey’s interests?
The lead author of this article has
spent years studying military history,
superpower rivalry, arms control, disarma-
ment and nonproliferation. Even when
looked at from these rich perspectives, no
feasible scenarios are imaginable under
which nuclear weapons would bring
additional security to Turkey. On the
contrary, any attempt to illegally pursue, let
alone acquire, nuclear weapons will be
extremely damaging to Turkey’s vital
interests. Turkey is passing through a
difficult domestic and international political
conjuncture in which there are many
sensitive issues (social, economic, political)
to be exploited by its rivals. In addition, at a
time when its relations with the United
States and the EU are in decline, these
countries may be of no help in dealing with
the problems that will arise.
If one imagines for a moment that
Turkey has acquired nuclear weapons
capability, under which scenarios and
against whom will these weapons have
added value in Turkey’s foreign and
security policies? It is hard to give a
meaningful answer to this question. Out of
Turkey’s neighbors, Iraq is under U.S.
occupation and will be its protectorate
possibly for a long period to come. Even if
the United States withdrew fully from Iraq,
its commitment to the security of that
country will most likely remain the same.
Syria, even with its ballistic missiles and
chemical-weapons arsenal, could not deter
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Turkey’s coercion in 1998, aimed at
expelling the head of the PKK, Abdullah
Ocalan, from that country. Even if Iran’s
nuclear-weapons capability disrupted its
balance of power with Turkey, this alone
might not be a justification for going
nuclear, with all the hardships this would
entail. A nuclear-weapons-capable Iran will
most likely have to be dealt with collec-
tively by the international community, the
United States and Israel at the forefront.
Greece and Armenia are other potential
countries with which Turkey has had
problems in its foreign relations. However,
the EU membership of Greece and the
powerful Armenian diasporas in the United
States and Europe will most likely nullify
the nuisance potential of a nuclear Turkey.
In addition, Turkey has good neighborly
relations with the rest of the countries in its
environs, such as Bulgaria, Romania (now
NATO allies), the Ukraine, Georgia and
Russia (which still keeps a large nuclear
arsenal). Thus, there seems to be no
possible feasible scenario whereby Turkey
could expect effective use of its nuclear
power-status. However, there are sce-
narios in which Turkey’s vital interests can
be seriously damaged simply because it will
have attempted, or even succeeded, in
acquiring a nuclear-weapons capability.
It is unfortunate that a debate has
taken place in Turkey for the last several
years around this subject, without the
contribution of informed and educated
views from experts in the field. Most of the
debate is emotional, reactive to daily
events, and also partly ideological. These
reactions, however, must be avoided in
order to preserve Turkey’s political unity
and territorial integrity for as long as
possible and to serve the primary interests
of the Turkish nation. For this to happen,
the factors that trigger such a debate must
be eliminated, including, among others, the
possibility of Iran’s nuclear-weapons
development. Second, intellectuals, com-
munity leaders and concerned citizens must
get involved in the debate in order to
enlighten the public as well as the
decisionmakers. Third, Turkey must invest
in the scientific and technological areas
that will seize the future and help advance
the quality of life in the country and in the
rest of the world.
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